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Abstract	The	view	that	 the	 fundamental	kind	properties	are	 intrinsic	properties	enjoys	reflexive	endorsement	by	most	metaphysicians	of	science.	 	But	ontic	structural	realists	deny	that	there	 are	 any	 fundamental	 intrinsic	properties	 at	 all.	 	 Given	 that	 structuralists	distrust	intuition	 as	 a	 guide	 to	 truth,	 and	 given	 that	 we	 currently	 lack	 a	 fundamental	 physical	theory	that	we	could	consult	instead	to	order	settle	the	issue,	it	might	seem	as	if	there	is	simply	nowhere	for	this	debate	to	go	at	present.		However,	I	will	argue	that	there	exists	an	as-yet	untapped	resource	 for	arguing	 for	ontic	structuralism	–	namely,	 the	way	 that	fundamentality	 is	 conceptualized	 in	 our	 most	 fundamental	 physical	 frameworks.	 	 By	arguing	that	physical	objects	must	be	subject	 to	the	 ‘Goldilock’s	principle’	 if	 they	are	to	count	 as	 fundamental,	 I	 argue	 that	 we	 can	 no	 longer	 view	 the	 majority	 of	 properties	defining	them	as	intrinsic.		As	such,	ontic	structural	realism	can	be	regarded	as	the	right	metaphysics	for	fundamental	physics,	and	that	this	is	so	even	though	we	do	not	yet	claim	to	know	precisely	what	that	fundamental	physics	is.	
Keywords:	 Ontic	 structural	 realism,	 quantum	 field	 theory,	 fundamentality,	 property	metaphysics.	
1.	Introduction		Taking	 Ladyman’s	 seminal	 1998	 paper	 to	 mark	 its	 contemporary	 inception,	 ontic	structural	 realism	 (OSR)	 has	 now	been	 lurking	 as	 a	 philosophical	 position	 for	 the	 best	part	 of	 two	 decades.	 Seeming	 both	 promising	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 master	 argument	against	 scientific	 realism	and	a	 fitting	metaphysic	 for	quantum	physics,	 this	period	has	seen	vibrant	debate	concerning	OSR’s	central	contention	that	it	is	structure,	not	objects,	
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that	 is	 ontologically	 fundamental.	 But	while	 those	debates	have	without	 question	been	informative	and	illuminating,	several	pieces	of	the	structuralist	puzzle	remain	to	be	put	into	place.	In	particular,	it	seems	that	structuralists	will	need	to	say	something	about	the	
fundamental	kind	properties	 if	 it	 is	 to	gain	more	 converts.	 For	 if	 there	 is	one	 thing	 that	unites	the	more	mainstream	metaphysicians	of	science	that	OSR	stands	opposed	to,	it	is	the	prevailing	 intuition	 that	 the	 fundamental	kind	properties	are	 intrinsic	 in	 character;	fundamental	 intrinsic	properties	of	any	 sort,	 however,	 are	 anathema	 to	 structuralism.	1			Of	 course,	 structuralists	 are	 likely	 to	 object	 at	 this	 point	 that	what	 anyone’s	 intuitions	regarding	 matters	 of	 fundamental	 ontology	 happen	 to	 be	 are	 wholly	 irrelevant	 to	metaphysics.	 	OSR	is,	after	all,	an	avowedly	naturalistic	and	self-consciously	revisionary	thesis,	and	structuralists	will	hold	that	we	need	to	look	at	the	relevant	physics	if	we	want	to	develop	a	defensible	metaphysics	of	it.		However,	such	a	move	runs	into	the	difficulty	that	we	do	not	currently	take	ourselves	to	know	what	the	truly	fundamental	kinds	are	–	or	at	 the	very	 least,	we	do	not	 take	ourselves	 to	have	a	 truly	 fundamental	 theory	of	 them.		Given	that	we	therefore	seem	to	lack	the	one	theory	that	could	be	invoked	to	adjudicate	on	the	matter	of	what	fundamental	properties	are	like,	it	seems	that	structuralists	must	either	 sit	 on	 their	 hands	 until	 we	 have	 that	 fundamental	 theory,	 or	 baldly	 reject	 the	received	intuition;	either	way,	it	seems	unlikely	that	they	will	succeed	in	persuading	the	unconverted	anytime	soon.			In	this	paper,	I	want	to	argue	that	such	pessimism,	while	understandable,	is	nevertheless	mistaken:	 OSR	 need	 neither	 be	 regarded	 as	 false,	 nor	 as	 something	 to	 be	 put	 on	 ice	indefinitely.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that,	 although	 it	 is	 true	 that	 we	 lack	 a	 truly	fundamental	 theory	 of	 the	 properties	 that	 OSR’s	 sights	 must	 be	 trained	 on,	 we	 do	nevertheless	possess	a	framework	for	thinking	about	such	theories	that	can	plausibly	be	regarded	as	fundamental.		This	is	the	framework	of	quantum	field	theory	(QFT).	Crucially	for	 structuralism,	 this	 framework	 suggests	 that	 the	kind	properties	 that	will	 feature	 in																																																									1	See,	 e.g.	 Ladyman	 and	Ross	 (2007),	 p.	 131:	 ‘talk	 of	 unknowable	 intrinsic	 natures	 and	individuals	is	 idle	and	has	no	justified	place	in	metaphysics…	[T]here	are	objects	in	our	metaphysics	 but	 they	 have	 been	 purged	 of	 their	 intrinsic	 natures,	 identity,	 and	individuality,	and	they	are	not	metaphysically	fundamental.’	
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any	 fundamental	 theory,	whatever	 it	may	be,	 cannot	plausibly	be	 regarded	as	 intrinsic.			As	such,	I	will	argue	that	a	major	stumbling	block	to	OSR	can	be	overcome	today,	and	in	a	thoroughly	naturalistic	fashion.	In	more	detail,	the	layout	of	my	argument	will	be	as	follows.		In	Section	2	I	outline	what	commitment	to	OSR	involves,	and	emphasize	that	(a)	it	is	a	thesis	about	the	fundamental	in	particular,	and	that	(b)	it	seems	to	prohibit	objects	from	having	fundamental	intrinsic	properties.2		 In	 Section	 3	 I	 present	 how	 the	 case	 for	 OSR	 is	 typically	 made	 in	 the	literature,	 and	 emphasize	 that	 the	 widely-held	 intuition	 that	 the	 fundamental	 kind	properties	are	intrinsic	has	been	taken	to	render	OSR	unfeasible.		In	Section	3	I	consider	how	 structuralists	 might	 get	 around	 this	 problem,	 given	 that	 we	 currently	 lack	 the	appropriately	 fundamental	 theory	 of	 physics	 that	 could	 be	 appealed	 to	 in	 the	 hope	 of	settling	the	issue	in	their	favour:	my	proposal	will	be	that	we	can	use	the	framework	of	QFT	to	probe	such	theories	prior	to	our	being	acquainted	with	them.	 	In	Section	5	I	show	that	 the	 constraints	QFT	places	 on	 fundamental	 theories	means	 that	 fundamental	 kind	properties	cannot	be	regarded	as	intrinsic,	on	the	grounds	that	the	fundamentality	of	the	properties	 involved	 has	 implications	 for	 the	 existence	 and	 non-existence	 of	 objects	distinct	from	the	bearer.		Section	6	is	the	conclusion.			My	aim,	then,	is	to	show	how	QFT	and	the	concept	of	fundamentality	embedded	within	it	presents	ontic	structuralists	with	a	rich	new	resource	–	a	 resource	 that	allows	 them	to	deny	that	fundamental	kind	properties	are	intrinsic	qua	fundamental	properties.	 	 It	will	doubtless	already	be	clear,	however,	that	the	full	articulation	of	the	argument	is	going	to	be	rather	involved,	and	I	should	come	out	and	say	right	at	the	outset	that	the	argument	to	be	outlined	here	is	at	best	a	suggestive	sketch.	 	Its	tentativeness	owes	partly	to	the	fact	that	 there	remain	a	 few	purely	kinematic	properties	not	 touched	by	 the	argument,	and	partly	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 some	 relevant	 mathematical	 methods	 required	 to	 understand	fundamental	theories	 in	their	 full	generality	await	 further	development.	 	My	conclusion	will	therefore	not	be	a	categorical	claim	that	OSR	is	true,	but	rather	the	weaker	and	more	tentative	 one	 that	 everything	 we	 know	 about	 physics	 is	 pointing	 in	 that	 direction.																																																										2	See	though	qualifications	on	this	claim	in	Section	4.	
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Nevertheless,	 this	 lack	of	 anything	definitive	 to	 say	at	 this	point	need	not	be	 seen	as	 a	criticism:	on	the	contrary,	one	could	interpret	it	as	showing	that	OSR	remains	an	ongoing,	active,	 and	 exploratory	 research	 programme	 marching	 in	 step	 with	 the	 progress	 of	physics.			
	
2.	OSR	as	a	Fundamentality	Thesis	While	it	has	a	number	of	different	articulations,	at	its	core	OSR	is	a	proposal	concerning	what	 is	 ontologically	 fundamental	 to	 this	 world.	 	 As	 the	 name	 suggests,	 the	 position	proposes	 that	 the	 mantle	 of	 fundamentality,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 actual	 world,	 belongs	 to	structure	and	structure	alone.	 	Thus	while	contemporary	structuralists	are	typically	not	so	 radical	 as	 to	 claim	 that	 there	 are	 no	 objects	 simplicter,	 their	 proposal	 is	 that	 the	category	of	objects	has	to	be	regarded	as	ontologically	secondary	to	that	of	structure.		To	quote	 Ladyman,	 they	 hold	 that	 “relational	 structure	 is	 more	 ontologically	 fundamental	
than	objects”,	and	for	brevity	let	this	be	the	‘core	claim’	of	OSR.3	It	is	clear	that,	as	a	fundamentality	thesis,	OSR	needs	to	work	for	the	most	fundamental	objects	 if	 it	 is	 to	work	at	all.	Thus	while	OSRists	have	recently	elaborated	on	what	OSR	has	 to	 offer	 to	 the	 special	 sciences,	 it	 must	 nevertheless	 be	 the	 case	 that	 the	 most	
fundamental	objects	of	physics	are	amenable	to	structuralist	analysis	 if	 the	position	is	to	stand	up.			In	focusing	its	core	claim	on	the	fundamental	like	this,	OSR	echoes	the	overall	trend	in	metaphysics	away	from	theorizing	about	ordinary	objects	and	towards	the	task	of	 ‘limning	 fundamental	 structure’	 –	 a	 project	 also	 engaged	 in	 by	 leading	 analytic	metaphysicians	of	the	day,	such	as	Ted	Sider,	Jonathan	Schaffer,	and	L.A.	Paul.		But	while	OSRists	 take	 themselves	 to	 be	 distinguished	 from	 their	more	 analytic	 counterparts	 by	their	more	 naturalistic	 approach,	 they	 have	 been	 criticized	 for	 being	 less	 explicit	 than	they	as	to	their	conception	of	ontological	priority,	and	have	often	been	guilty	of	slipping																																																									3	Ladyman	and	Ross	op	cit.,	p	145.			It	might	be	objected	that	with	this	characterization	I	am	equating	OSR	with	its	radical	version,	while	OSR	also	admits	a	moderate	version.		But	I	 leave	 the	 question	 of	whether	 the	 considerations	 below	 lend	 support	 to	 one	 form	 of	structuralism	at	the	expense	of	the	other	to	another	occasion.	
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and	sliding	between	non-coextensive	relations	when	spelling	out	their	claims.4	Another,	perennial	criticism	of	it	is	that	how	structural	features	are	supposed	to	be	distinguished	from	 non-structural	 features	 is	 likewise	 left	 somewhat	 imprecise.	 	 	 Clearly,	 however,	without	some	such	distinction	we	cannot	even	say	of	what	it	is	that	is	to	be	graced	with	fundamental	status.			In	order	to	clarify	OSR’s	core	claim	that	structure	is	more	fundamental	than	objects,	then,	we	must	 clarify	 both	 how	 ontological	 priority	 is	 conceived	 and	 also	 what	 it	 is	 that	 is	meant	by	‘structure’.		So	as	not	to	get	too	bogged	down	in	the	details,	I	suggest	that	we	do	the	 following.	 	With	regard	to	ontological	priority,	we	will	 follow	Chakravartty	 in	using	the	relation	of	 identity	determination	 to	express	 it:	not	only	 is	 this	a	relation	 frequently	invoked	 in	 the	 literature,	 but	 also	 one	 that	 may	 be	 argued	 on	 general	 metaphysical	grounds	to	be	an	apt	relation	for	structuralism	(though	I	shall	not	argue	for	that	here).5		As	such,	to	the	extent	that	the	fundamentality	claim	definitive	of	OSR	does	not	go	through	with	respect	to	identity	determination	–	that	is,	to	the	extent	that	the	identities	of	objects	turn	out	not	to	be	determined	by	structures	–	we	will	take	it	that	it	that	OSR	does	not	go	through	 simpliciter.	 	 Regarding	 the	 contrast	 between	 structure	 and	 non-structure,	 I	propose	 that	 we	 be	 somewhat	 liberal	 do	 not	 demand	 that	 structuralists	 must	 give	necessary	 and	 sufficient	 conditions	 for	 what	 counts	 as	 an	 ‘object’	 and	what	 counts	 as	‘structure’	before	we	agree	to	examine	the	warrant	for	their	thesis;	for	plausibly,	all	that	needs	to	be	shown	for	OSR	to	go	through	is	that	entities	ordinarily	taken	as	paradigms	of	
fundamental	 objects	 can	 be	 shown	 to	 be	 secondary	 to	 entities	 ordinarily	 taken	 as	
paradigms	 of	 structures.6		 With	 respect	 to	 the	 first	 category,	 it	 seems	 that	 there	 is	 no	better	 candidate	 than	 fundamental	 particles,	 and	 as	 such	 our	 focus	 will	 be	 on	 those.7																																																										4		See	e.g.	Hawley	(2010).	5	I	discuss	this	further	in	McKenzie	(in	preparation).	6	Part	of	 the	 reason	 it	 seems	 folly	 to	me	 to	give	necessary	and	 sufficient	 conditions	 for	objecthood	 is	because	 the	concept	has	evolved	so	much	over	 the	history	of	physics	–	a	history	that	is	of	course	itself	a	large	part	of	the	structuralist	story.		7	Note	 that	my	 argument	will	 go	 through	whether	we	 speak	 of	 particles	 or	 directly	 of	quantum	fields.		I	should	say	too	that	spacetime	points	are	taken	as	another	–	perhaps	the	only	other	–	candidate	for	 ‘fundamental	object’;	but	since	it	 is	hard	to	think	of	what	the	analogy	 of	 fundamental	 kind	 properties	 would	 be	 for	 these	 entities,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	
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With	 regard	 to	 the	 second	 category,	 we	 will	 here	 follow	 Maxwell	 and	 take	 structural	features	 to	 be	 ‘those	 that	 are	 not	 intrinsic’,	 8 	where	 we	 will	 understand	 intrinsic	properties	 somewhat	 intuitively	 as	 that	may	be	possessed	by	an	 entity	 independently	 of	
what	the	rest	of	the	world	is	like.9		As	such,	intrinsic	properties	are	those	properties	whose	possession	neither	demands	nor	precludes	 the	 existence	 of	 any	 object	 distinct	 from	 the	bearer	of	the	property.	 	Given	this	characterization	of	structural	features,	it	follows	that	
relations	 between	 and	 extrinsic	 properties	 of	 objects	 will	 qualify	 as	 numbering	 among	them.	 	 And	while	 one	 could	 object	 that	 there	 are	 intrinsic	 features	 of	 objects	 that	 also	qualify	as	structural	–	compositional	structure	being	the	obvious	example	–	it	much	less	clear	that	fundamental	objects	could	have	such	features.		Our	focus	here	is	on	just	those	objects,	and	we	will	take	it	as	given	that	they	cannot.10			
																																																																																																																																																																															structuralism	will	 be	 easier	 to	 secure	 in	 the	 spacetime	 case.	 	 (See	 Ladyman	 and	 Ross	(2007),	Section	3.2	for	discussion	of	it.)	8	This	quote	is	from	Maxwell	(1970),	p.	188:	while	he	was	an	early	advocate	of	epistemic	structuralism	–	but	 one	 can	 find	 the	 same	equation	of	 structuralism	with	 the	denial	 of	intrinsic	natures	in	the	OSR	canon,	e.g.	Ladyman	and	Ross	(cf.	footnote	1).		
9	Thus	Weatherson	and	Marshall	(2012)	take	it	that	‘a	thing	has	its	intrinsic	properties	in	virtue	 of	 the	 way	 that	 thing	 itself,	 and	 nothing	 else,	 is’;	 similarly,	 for	 Dunn	 (1990),	‘Metaphysically,	 an	 intrinsic	 property	 of	 an	 object	 is	 a	 property	 that	 the	 object	 has	 by	virtue	of	 itself,	depending	on	no	other	 thing’	 (p.	178).	While	 the	existence	of	 the	minor	industry	 in	metaphysics	dedicated	to	defining	 intrinsicality	suggests	 that	 this	could	use	some	sharpening	up,	I	will	be	content	to	rest	with	this	informal	characterization	in	what	follows.			One	reason	for	this	is	that	the	by-now	standard	formal	definition	of	Langton	and	Lewis	(1998)	is	far	from	ideal	in	this	context:	for	one	thing,	their	analysis	makes	appeal	to	 perfectly	 natural	 properties,	which	 for	 Lewis	 are	 both	 fundamental	 and	 intrinsic	 by	definition	–	precisely	that	which	this	paper	denies.	
10	Afficionados	 of	 ‘group	 structural	 realism’	 will	 rightly	 object	 at	 this	 point	 that	 I	 am	simply	 ignoring	 the	 claim	 that	 even	 intrinsic	 features	 of	 fundamental	 objects	 may	 be	accounted	 for	 structurally	 –	 namely,	 by	 utilizing	 the	 symmetry	 structures	 that	 are	 so	central	 to	 contemporary	 physics	 theories	 (see,	 e.g.	 Ladyman	 and	 Ross	 Section	 3.3).		Though	 regrettably	 this	 issue	 demands	 a	 far	 fuller	 discussion	 than	 I	 can	 give	 it	 here,	suffice	to	say	that	–	despite	once	holding	this	view	myself	(see	e.g.	McKenzie	2012)	–	I	no	longer	 think	 that	 it	 works.	 	 To	 see	 this,	 it	 suffices	 to	 note	 that	 although	we	 know	 the	symmetries	 of,	 eg,	 the	 Standard	 Model,	 many	 of	 the	 kind	 properties	 definitive	 of	 the	particles	in	it	are	nevertheless	free	parameters.	 	Thus	symmetry	structure	does	not	–	at	least	not	in	general	–	determine	the	fundamental	kind	properties.		(One	can	at	most	say	
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Putting	everything	together,	then,	for	us	an	effort	to	defend	OSR’s	core	claim	will	consist	an	effort	 to	 show	 that	 the	identities	of	 fundamental	objects	are	determined	exclusively	 in	
terms	 of	 relations	 and	 extrinsic	 features.	 	 An	 obvious	 corollary	 is	 that	 no	 recourse	 to	intrinsic	 properties	 will	 need	 be	 made	 in	 specifying	 the	 identities	 of	 fundamental	particles.			I	 propose,	 then,	 that	 if	 we	 are	 to	 establish	 OSR	 then	 this	 is	 what	 we	 must	 try	 to	 do.	Worryingly	for	structuralists,	however,	it	has	been	claimed	that	this	is	precisely	what	we	
cannot	do,	 for	 intrinsic	properties	 ineliminably	enter	 into	 identities	at	 the	 fundamental	level.	 In	 particular,	 has	 been	 claimed	 that	 the	 fundamental	 kind	 properties	 that	 sort	particles	 into	species	are	 intrinsic	properties,	and	that	 these	are	properties	 that	cannot	be	left	out	of	the	inventory	of	identifying	properties.	11		In	the	next	section,	I	will	give	just	enough	of	an	overview	of	the	work	that	identity	determination	has	done	in	OSR	to	bring	out	the	problem	of	intrinsics.		After	that,	I	will	consider	the	difficulties	that	structuralists	face	in	getting	around	the	problem,	before	proposing	a	new	and	more	promising	line	of	attack.		
3.	Identity	Determination	and	the	Argument	from	Intrinsics	One	nice	feature	of	the	identity	-based	approach	to	structuralism	is	that	it	applies	both	in	the	 context	 of	 spacetime	 theory	 and	 in	 quantum	 mechanics	 –	 the	 two	 mainstays	 of	philosophy	of	physics.		In	the	spacetime	context,	the	purported	determination	of	objects	by	relations	 is	supported	by	the	hole	argument	 in	general	relativity,	since	this	suggests	that	 primitive	 identities	 for	 spacetime	 points	 subjects	 physics	 to	 form	 of	 a	 priori																																																																																																																																																																																that	 they	depend	on	 such	 features;	 but	 I	 no	 longer	 regard	dependence	 as	 a	 relation	 of	priority.	 	 I	 discuss	 this	 a	 little	 further	 in	 McKenzie	 (in	 preparation).)	 	 It	 is	 however	possible	that	this	situation	may	change	with	further	developments	of	physics,	and	indeed	many	physicists	hope	that	this	will	be	the	case.	Nevertheless,	that	observation	is	clearly	of	little	use	in	defending	structuralism	today.	11	Since	kind	properties	are	common	both	to	quantum	fields	and	their	associated	quanta	–	the	corresponding	particles	–	it	doesn’t	matter	for	my	purposes	whether	we	regard	the	fundamental	objects	of	physics	as	particles	or	fields.		I	will	mostly	stick	to	‘particle’.	
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indeterminism.12		 In	 the	 quantum	 context,	 the	 argument	 is	 premised	 on	 the	 fact	 that	quantum	unlike	classical	particles	cannot	in	general	be	distinguished	from	others	of	the	same	type	by	spatiotemporal	location	or	trajectory.	13			Furthermore,	when	such	particles	become	 entangled	 with	 others,	 none	 of	 the	 particles	 in	 the	 resulting	 state	 can	 be	distinguished	from	the	others	through	empirical	means.	Thus	unless	we	are	to	postulate	problematic	 ‘primitive	 thisnesses’	 to	 ground	 the	 numerical	 diversity	 of	 entangled	particles,	 all	 that	 remains	 that	 can	 play	 this	 role	 are	 the	 features	 of	 the	 entanglement	relation	 itself.	 	 Fortunately,	 however,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 case	 of	 fermions	 –	 the	 basic	constituents	of	matter	–	one	can	appeal	to	such	features	to	perform	this	role.		For	in	the	case	 of	 entanglement	 between	 two	 fermions	 –	 two	 electrons,	 say	 –	 the	 relations	 may	generically	be	represented	as		
!! (| ↑! 	| ↓! 	−| ↓! 	| ↑! 	)						It	 is	 clear	 that	 if	 in	 this	 relation	we	 replace	 a	 label	 ‘1’	 with	 a	 label	 ‘2’,	 (or	 vice	 versa,	understanding	 ‘or’	 as	 exclusive),	 the	 relation	 disappears,	 thus	 establishing	 that	 the	relation	 is	 irreflexive.	 	 Since	 it	 follows	 from	 this	 that	 no	 one	 object	 can	 stand	 in	 this	relation	 to	 itself,	 we	 see	 that	 there	 are	 grounds	 for	 saying	 not	 only	 that	 the	 particles	involved	 are	 distinct,	 but	 also	 that	 it	 is	 a	 feature	 of	 the	 relations	 between	 them	 that	underwrites	this	distinctness.	Since	facts	about	an	entity’s	distinctness	from	other	things	clearly	 qualify	 as	 facts	 about	 its	 identity,	 and	 since	 (I	 have	 claimed)	 facts	 about	determination	 of	 identity	 should	 be	 taken	 to	 track	 facts	 about	 priority,	 these	considerations	 about	 individuation	 are	 often	 presented	 as	 sufficient	 to	 secure	 ontic	structuralism	about	quantum	physics.14			While	these	arguments	concerning	how	object	identities	are	determined	by	structure	are	central	 planks	 of	 the	 structuralist	 scheme,	many	 objections	 have	 been	 pitched	 against																																																									12	See,	for	example,	Ladyman	and	Ross	op.	cit.,	Section	3.2.	13	See,	e.g.	ibid.,	Section	3.1.		14	See	especially	 ibid.,	p.	138.	 	Note	 that	entanglement	becomes	even	more	pervasive	 in	quantum	 field	 theoretic	 regimes	 (see	e.g.	Lam	(2013),	particularly	Section	2).	 	As	 such,	the	conclusions	regarding	the	role	of	entanglement	in	securing	the	diversity	of	same-kind	quantum	systems	will	carry	over	to	the	QFT	context	to	be	discussed	below.				
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them.		For	one	thing,	it	is	at	least	strange	that	while	in	the	spacetime	case	the	argument	aims	 to	 show	 there	 are	 no	 haecceities,	 the	 analogous	 argument	 in	 the	 quantum	 case	seems	to	have	them	simply	ruled	out	by	fiat.15		For	another	thing,	it	is	essential	to	physics	that	 bosons	 be	 countable	 (for	 example,	 when	 confirming	 quantum	 field	 theories	 via	scattering	 experiments,	 in	which	 the	number	 of	 photons	produced	 can	be	 crucial);	 but	the	argument,	at	 least	as	outlined	above,	seems	to	give	 the	wrong	answer	 for	bosons.16		However,	the	most	salient	objection	for	present	purposes	is	that	by	claiming	victory	on	the	basis	of	these	arguments,	it	seems	that	OSR	aspires	only	to	giving	a	structural	account	of	 the	numerical	diversity	of	 fundamental	particles	of	a	given	kind.	 	 Such	an	aspiration	clearly	takes	for	granted	that	particles	are	sorted	into	kinds	in	the	first	place.	But	these	facts	 about	 what	makes	 particles	 particles	 of	 a	 given	 kind,	 as	 opposed	 to	 particles	 of	another	kind,	seem	to	constitute	just	as	crucial	an	aspect	of	the	identities	of	particles	as	facts	about	their	distinctness	from	others	of	the	same	type.		Clearly,	therefore,	something	needs	 to	 be	 said	 by	 the	 structuralist	 about	 their	 interpretation	 of	 fundamental	 kind	properties.	 Alarmingly	 for	 structuralists,	 however,	 the	 view	 that	 these	 properties	 are	
intrinsic	 properties	 is	 very	 much	 the	 received	 view	 in	 metaphysics.	 	 	 Since	 we	 have	identified	structural	features	precisely	with	‘those	that	are	not	intrinsic’,	this	clearly	does	not	 bode	 well.	 	 Indeed,	 things	 look	 so	 bad	 it	 would	 be	 easy	 to	 suspect	 from	 the	comparative	paucity	of	discussion	on	this	issue	in	the	OSR	literature	that	they	have	been	not	so	much	overlooked	as	studiously	ignored.17	Here	is	how	Chakravartty	puts	the	problem.			[L]et	us	grant	for	the	sake	of	argument	here	the	orthodox	interpretation	according																																																									15	This	is	not	the	case	in	all	structuralists’	hands:	Steven	French,	for	example,	partly	premises	his	structuralism	on	the	fact	that	haecceities	cannot	be	ruled	out	a	priori	(see	e.g.	French	1998).		But	French	is	an	exception	here,	especially	now	that	James	Ladyman	no	longer	bases	his	structuralism	on	the	underdetermination	argument.			16	At	least	as	I	understand	the	presentation	in	Saunders	(2003);	see	Huggett	and	Norton	(2014)	for	a	much	fuller	discussion.	17	Here	again	 I	emphasize,	as	 I	did	at	 footnote	10,	 that	structuralists	have	had	things	 to	say	about	kind	properties.	But	it	is	certainly	the	case	that	structuralists	have	sometimes	spoken	as	if	the	above	considerations	regarding	diversity	are	in	themselves	sufficient	to	establish	the	position,	and	Chakravartty	is	right	to	protest	that	that	is	much	too	hasty.				
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to	 which	 quantum	 particles	 have	 relations	 that	 cannot	 be	 analyzed	 in	 terms	 of	anything	intrinsic.	Would	this	demonstrate	that	the	identities	of	these	objects	are	extrinsic,	 in	 the	 manner	 suggested	 by	 the	 ontological	 priority	 thesis	 of	 non-eliminative	OSR?18	The	answer,	I	suggest,	is	no.	In	order	for	the	appeal	to	extrinsic	[properties]	in	this	context	to	offer	any	support	to	non-eliminative	OSR,	it	would	seem	that	one	of	the	two	following	conditions	should	obtain.	Either	it	should	be	the	case	that	not	 just	some,	 but	 all	 properties	 of	 the	 particles	 described	 by	 quantum	 theory	 are	extrinsic,	 or	 it	 should	 be	 the	 case	 that	whatever	 intrinsic	 properties	 the	 theory	does	attribute	to	them	do	not	determine	their	identity.	[…]		But	neither	condition	obtains.	 While	 some	 properties	 are	 described	 by	 quantum	 theory	 in	 terms	 of	relations	of	entanglement,	others	are	not.	Mass	and	charge,	for	example,	are	state-independent	 intrinsic	 properties	 of	 subatomic	 particles,	 whose	 attribution	 thus	violates	the	first	condition	that	all	properties	be	extrinsic…	[T]he	fact	remains	that	wherever	one	applies	the	concept	of	a	particle,	the	theory	presents	descriptions	of	what	appear	to	be	intrinsic	properties	which	are	constitutive	of	their	identity.19	The	view	that	Chakravartty	reports	in	this	passage	is	certainly	not	idiosyncratic:	it	is	so	well-entrenched	that	it	probably	deserves	to	be	called	the	‘received	view’	in	metaphysics.		His	 fellow	dispositional	essentialist	Bird,	 for	example,	states	that	 ‘no-one	has	suggested	that	 charge,	 rest	 mass	 and	 spin	 are	 not	 intrinsic’,	 and	 indeed	 the	 same	 policy	 on	fundamental	properties	is	shared	even	by	their	Humean	rivals	(most	obviously,	Lewis).20			But	if	metaphysicians	as	divided	on	virtually	every	other	issue	of	scientific	metaphysics	can	nevertheless	agree	on	the	issue	of	intrinsicality,	then	structuralists	had	better	give	an	impressive	 argument	 as	 to	 why	 the	 view	 is	 wrong.	 	 Let	 this	 objection	 that	 the	intrinsicality	of	these	properties	forecloses	OSR	be	the	‘argument	from	intrinsics’.		Since	OSR	 is	 the	 thesis	 that	 no	 identity-determining	 features	 of	 fundamental	 objects	 are																																																									18	By	‘non-eliminative	OSR’,	Chakravartty	means	any	form	of	OSR	in	which	objects	are	taken	to	exist	but	taken	to	be	non-fundamental	19	Chakravartty	(2012),	p.	204.	20	Bird	2007,	p.	125;	e.g.	Lewis	1983,	p.	357.			
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intrinsic	 in	 character,	 the	 argument	 from	 intrinsics	 throws	 the	 gauntlet	 firmly	 at	 the	structuralists’	feet.				
4.	The	Structuralist	Dilemma	and	A	New	Strategy	Structuralists	 therefore	 need	 to	 find	 a	 way	 of	 rebutting	 the	 argument	 from	 intrinsics.		What,	then,	are	they	to	say?		No	doubt,	structuralists	will	be	quick	to	point	out	that	while	it	 is	 certainly	 the	 case	 that	 kind	 properties	 like	 charge	 and	 mass	 are	 ‘commonly	regarded’21	as	 intrinsic	–	while	 it	may	even	be	that	 ‘no-one	has	suggested’	that	they	are	not	 intrinsic,	at	 least	no-one	 failing	 to	self-identify	as	a	 structuralist	–	 remarkably	 little	argument	for	this	claim	is	ever	given.22		But	if	the	intrinsic	properties	are	those	that	can	be	had	even	by	a	 lonely	object,	 then	given	that	we	will	obviously	never	encounter	such	objects	it	is	just	very	hard	to	say	whether	these	properties	are	intrinsic	or	not	–	in	much	the	same	way	that	it	is	difficult,	as	Mach	noted,	to	say	what	would	happen	to	a	bucket	in	an	empty	universe.23		Given	this,	rather	than	simply	backing	down	before	the	intuitions	that	metaphysicians	may	happen	to	share	on	the	matter,	the	structuralist	will	likely	insist	that	what	we	must	do	–	indeed,	all	we	can	do	–	is	look	at	what	a	suitable	theory	of	physics	has	to	say	about	it,	and	defer	to	that.		But	if	that’s	the	plan,	then	structuralists	face	a	problem.		This	problem	is	that,	as	already	underlined,	 OSR	 is	 ultimately	 a	 fundamentality	 thesis,	 but	we	 do	 not	 take	 ourselves	 to	possess	a	truly	fundamental	theory.		As	such,	we	do	not	take	ourselves	to	have	a	theory	that	 would	 definitely	 answer	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 or	 not	 we	 can	 regard	 the	fundamental	kind	properties	as	intrinsic	or	not.	Thus	even	the	Standard	Model	of	particle	physics	(describing	the	interactions	of	quarks,	leptons,	and	gauge	bosons),	while	without	doubt	the	most	fundamental	theory	we	have	been	able	to	produce	to	date,	is	nevertheless																																																									21	Cf.	Esfeld	2014.				22	The	closest	one	seems	to	get	 is	the	argument	from	dispositional	that	their	postulated	intrinsicality	is	not	inconsistent	with	their	assumed	dispositional	nature.		See	e.g.	Bird	op	
cit.		23	Some	of	the	difficulties	involved	in	justifying	the	claim	that	the	properties	of	physical	objects	are	intrinsic	are	given	in	Slater	and	Haufe	(2009),	Section	4.		
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not	thought	not	to	be	truly	fundamental	–	partly	on	account	of	its	failure	to	incorporate	gravity,	its	surfeit	of	free	parameters,	and	suspected	divergence	in	the	high-energy	limit.		As	 such,	 it	 cannot	 definitively	 answer	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 fundamental	properties	are	intrinsic;	and	if	it	isn’t	qualified	then	it	is	hard	to	see	what	is.		Given	this,	it	seems	that	structuralists	must	simply	sit	on	their	hands	until	a	truly	fundamental	theory	comes	along	that	they	can	cite	in	support	of	their	argument.	But	that	may	be	a	long	time	in	coming	–	assuming	it	will	ever	happen	at	all.		The	 defence	 of	 OSR	 at	 this	 point	 therefore	 seems	 to	 have	 run	 into	 the	 ground.	 	While	structuralists	 face	 an	 uphill	 struggle	 in	 talking	 metaphysicians	 out	 of	 an	 intuition,	apparently	universally	 shared,	 concerning	 fundamental	kinds,	 they	want	 for	 the	 theory	that	 they	 can	 appeal	 to	 in	 order	 to	 try	 and	 settle	 the	 issue	 in	 their	 favour.	What	 I	will	propose	 here,	 however,	 is	 that	 contrary	 to	 appearances	 structuralists	 need	 not	 simply	down	tools	for	now,	for	there	may	be	a	third	way	of	defending	OSR	that	relies	neither	on	intuition	trading	nor	on	our	possession	of	a	truly	fundamental	theory.		What	makes	this	third	 way	 possible	 is	 that,	 while	 we	 lack	 such	 a	 theory,	 we	 do	 nevertheless	 have	 a	
framework	for	theories	that	may	well	be	fundamental.		This	is	the	framework	of	quantum	
field	theory.24		What	it	means	to	call	QFT	a	framework	and	not	so	much	a	theory	(despite	the	name)	is	that,	when	we	think	of	a	theory	in	physics,	we	think	of	a	set	of	objects,	such	as	fields	and	their	associated	particles,	and	a	law	of	their	interaction;	QFT,	on	the	other	hand,	 constitutes	 a	 set	 of	 principles	 that	 constrain	 any	 theory	 that	 claims	 to	 describe	relativistic	 quantum	 systems.25		 As	 such,	 this	 framework	 can	 be	 used	 to	 define	 an	unlimited	 number	 of	 different	 theories,	 depending	 on	 the	 fields	 whose	 behaviour	 we	want	to	model	and	the	interactions	we	postulate	between	them.			The	crucial	claim	that	I	will	 make	 here	 is	 that	 when	we	 reflect	 upon	 the	 constraints	 that	 the	 QFT	 framework	places	on	fundamental	theories	in	particular,	we	see	that	there	is	actually	positive	reason	to	deny	that	the	fundamental	kind	properties	are	intrinsic	–	at	least	in	the	vast	majority	
																																																								24	On	 the	 notion	 of	 theories	 as	 contrasted	 with	 frameworks	 for	 theories,	 see	 Shimony	(1987),	p.	209.	25	For	 example,	 that	 any	 law	must	be	Lorentz	 invariant,	 that	 the	 states	of	QFT	 systems	must	superpose,	and	so	on.	
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of	cases.26		This	is	because	their	very	status	as	fundamental	kind	properties	turns	out	to	be	highly	sensitive	 to	what	other	kinds	exist	 in	 the	world	besides	 the	kind	 in	question.				As	 a	 result,	 we	 should	 regard	 the	 fundamental	 level	 as	 populated	 not	 by	 fundamental	objects	with	 intrinsic	natures,	but	 rather	with	objects	whose	very	status	as	fundamental	enmeshes	them	in	a	rich	nexus	of	dependences	to	one	another.		It	should	be	noted,	then,	that	since	my	claim	is	that	the	fundamental	kind	properties	are	extrinsic	qua	fundamental	
properties,	the	argument	has	nothing	to	say	about	worlds	in	which	those	kinds	exist	but	are	 not	 fundamental	 –	 on	 the	 (highly)	 questionable	 supposition	 that	 such	 worlds	 are	possible.	 	But	 since	 it	 is	 giving	an	account	of	 the	 fundamental	 in	particular	 that	OSR	 is	concerned	with,	 the	 fact	 that	 these	properties	cannot	be	regarded	as	 intrinsic	wherever	
they	occur	as	fundamental	properties	should	be	good	enough	for	it.		In	the	next	section	of	this	paper	I	will	try	to	make	good	on	my	claim	that	fundamentality	conceptualized	à	la	QFT	offers	a	new	line	of	support	to	structuralism.	 	Before	I	do	that,	however,	 I	 need	 to	 make	 a	 few	 qualifications	 and	 disclaimers.	 	 The	 first	 of	 these	qualifications	is	that,	as	will	already	have	been	noticed,	I	have	already	slipped	in	that	my	argument,	although	highly	general,	will	apply	only	to	 ‘the	vast	majority’	of	 fundamental	properties.		The	reason	for	this	qualification	is	that,	while	any	particle	in	QFT	must	have	some	 value	 of	 spin	 and	 parity	 (as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 symmetries	 of	 Minkowski	spacetime),	 my	 argument	 will	 not	 apply	 to	 these	 properties.	 	 This	 is	 because	 my	argument	applies	only	to	those	properties	that	are	associated	with	a	coupling	parameter	in	 the	 Lagrangian	defining	 the	 theory:	 these	 are	 any	properties	 through	which	particles	
interact	 with	 other	 particles,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 property	 of	 mass.27		 The	 value	 that	 the	parameter	 takes	 determines	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 interactions	 involved	 or	 the	 effective	mass	of	the	particle	respectively.28		Spin	and	parity,	on	the	other	hand,	are	not	associated	with	 coupling	 parameters,	 and	 while	 there	 is	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 these	 are	 the	 only																																																									26	OSRists	of	course	needs	it	to	be	the	case	that	no	fundamental	property	is	intrinsic,	and	we	shall	see	my	argument	does	not	apply	to	quite	all.		More	on	this	to	follow	presently.	27	We	 can	 think	 of	 the	 Lagrangian	 as	 just	 another	way	 of	 expressing	 the	 law	of	 nature	referred	to	by	the	theory.	28	Mass	has	this	status	even	in	anticipation	of	a	quantum	theory	of	gravitation	because	it	may	 in	 a	 sense	be	 regarded,	 in	 the	QFT	 context,	 as	 encoding	 the	 interactions	of	 a	 field	with	itself.		See	e.g.	Susskind	(2012)	for	a	qualitative	description.	
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properties	that	are	not	touched	by	the	argument	I	will	not	hazard	here	what	OSR	should	say	about	them.		Nevertheless,	it	remains	that	my	argument	will	see	off	the	vast	majority	of	 the	 properties	 cited	 by	 OSR’s	 critics,	 clearing	 the	 way	 for	 us	 to	 focus	 on	 these	 last	aspects.29		A	 further	 limitation	 to	point	 out	 is	 that	my	 argument	will	 not	 be	 conclusive	 even	with	respect	 to	 those	 properties	 that	 it	 succeeds	 in	 applying	 to.	 	 The	 reason	 is	 that,	 in	 the	approach	I	propose,	the	fundamentality	of	properties	is	to	be	conceived	of	in	terms	of	the	fundamentality	of	the	theories	in	which	they	occur;	but	precisely	what	features	theories	must	have	to	qualify	as	fundamental	is	something	not	yet	understood	in	its	full	generality.		My	argument	will	apply	only	to	the	class	of	fundamental	theories	that	we	do	understand	–	namely,	the	asymptotically	free	theories.		But	such	theories	are	only	a	subset	of	the	class	of	 asymptotically	 safe	 theories	 –	 where	 ‘asymptotically	 safe’	 is	 just	 another	 word	 for	fundamental	 QFTs.	 	While	 the	 features	 of	 asymptotically	 free	 theories	 are	 rather	well-understood,	 the	general	 features	of	 the	 remaining	 theories	 are	not	known	at	present	 –	indeed	they	are	difficult	even	‘to	imagine	or	investigate’.	30		It	is	thus	understandable	that	my	argument	 focuses	only	on	the	 former	case,	but	 this	strategy	obviously	runs	the	risk	that	my	conclusions	will	not	hold	when	we	generalize	out.			However,	the	reason	that	the	features	 of	 the	 more	 general	 class	 are	 not	 known	 is	 because	 the	 interrelationships	
between	the	couplings	 in	 these	 theories	 are	 so	 involved	and	 so	 complex	 that	 theorizing	about	them	proves	mathematically	prohibitive,	at	least	by	methods	currently	to	hand.		It	would	thus	in	my	opinion	be	very	surprising	if	the	holism	that	I	will	claim	is	manifest	in	the	restricted	class	were	not	present	in	the	more	general	one	–	indeed	surprising	if	not	still	more	pronounced.		Nevertheless,	for	the	moment	that	remains	mere	speculation	on	my	part.		
																																																								29	I	might	point	out	 too	 that	by	 focusing	primarily	on	 interaction	properties	 I	 am	 in	no	way	begging	the	question,	 for	–	as	dispositional	essentialists	have	long	been	at	pains	to	point	 out	 –	 the	 mere	 fact	 that	 a	 property	 is	 an	 interaction	 property	 does	 nothing	 to	undermine	its	intrinsic	status.		I	return	to	this	point	below.			30	Wilczek	(1999),	p.	2;	Kang	(1975),	p.	11.	
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A	final	point	to	underline	at	this	stage	is	that	my	argument	is	going	to	assume	that	QFT	is	indeed	a	 fundamental	 framework	 for	 theories,	so	 that	we	have	reason	to	 think	that	 the	fundamental	 level	 can	 indeed	be	described	within	 it.	What	 is	 certain	 is	 that	QFT	 is	our	most	fundamental	framework	for	physics	at	present,	at	least	that	we	are	able	to	submit	to	empirical	test;	there	is	moreover	increasing	optimism	about	it	being	a	truly	fundamental	framework,	owing	to	a	growing	sense	that	it	is	only	technical	obstacles	that	stand	in	the	way	of	a	quantum	field	theoretic	treatment	of	gravity.31	Nevertheless,	since	my	argument	depends	on	spacetime	having	the	continuous	structure	that	it	has	in	QFT,	and	since	some	(speculative)	 new	 physics	 frameworks	 deny	 this,	 the	 truth	 of	 my	 conclusions	 is	vulnerable	 to	 change	 as	 physics	 develops.	 	 Fundamentality	 is	 in	 that	 sense	 a	 highly	theoretical	concept.		However,	I	trust	that	those	of	a	naturalistic	outlook	will	not	see	this	as	necessarily	a	criticism,	as	opposed	to	simply	part	of	what	 it	means	to	do	naturalistic	metaphysics.	With	those	qualifications	and	clarifications	in	place,	let	me	proceed	to	the	argument.				
5.	 The	 Strategy	 Implemented:	 Supporting	 Structuralism	 in	 the	 Present	 via	
Fundamentality	Constraints	in	QFT	My	aim,	 then	 is	 to	 show	 that	 the	kind	properties	defining	 the	 fundamental	 particles	 of	physics	 are	 not	 intrinsic,	 and	 –	 to	 repeat	 –	 the	 properties	 I	 am	 focusing	 on	 are	 the	property	of	mass	and	the	properties	through	which	objects	interact:	let	us	call	the	latter	the	 ‘interaction	 properties’.32		 Having	 already	 said	 a	 little	 about	 what	 I’ll	 intend	 by	‘intrinsic’,	it	remains	to	say	something	about	how	‘fundamental	kind	property’	should	be	understood.			Since	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 game	 here	 is	 to	 show	 that	 the	 properties	 defining	 fundamental	objects	are	not	intrinsic,	it	seems	natural	(were	it	not	so	already)	to	define	‘fundamental	kind	property’	as	one	of	the	properties	that	sort	the	fundamental	objects	into	kinds.		But																																																									31	On	this,	see	Percacci	2009.	32	The	most	fundamental	interaction	properties	we	know	of	are	charge,	weak	isospin	and	colour	charge,	but	it	is	likely	that	at	some	of	these	are	not	truly	fundamental.			
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doing	 so	 just	 shifts	 the	 problem	 of	 defining	 ‘fundamental	 kind	 property’	 to	 defining	‘fundamental	objects’,	 and	 in	any	 relativistic	quantum	 theory	–	 that	 is,	 in	 any	quantum	field	theory	–	this	is	notoriously	difficult	to	do.		In	particular,	given	that	in	these	theories	even	(what	are	regarded	as)	point	particles	can	decay	into	other	particles,	any	attempt	to	define	 fundamentality	 in	mereological	 terms	 seems	 a	 hopeless	 enterprise.	 	 Partly	 as	 a	result	 of	 this,	 it	 is	 now	 standard	 to	 regard	 a	 fundamental	 particle	 as	 one	 whose	 field	
appears	directly	in	a	fundamental	Lagrangian	–	that	 is,	a	particle	whose	interactions	are	specified	by	a	fundamental	law	of	nature.33		We	should	therefore	regard	the	fundamental	kind	properties	 as	 the	properties	 that	 sort	 the	objects	 evolving	 in	 accordance	with	 the	fundamental	 laws	 of	 nature	 into	 kinds.	 	 In	 so	 doing,	 we	 use	 the	 fundamental	 laws	 to	define	the	fundamental	kind	properties.	To	find	out	whether	these	properties	are	intrinsic,	then,	it	appears	that	we	must	consult	the	fundamental	laws	of	physics,	look	at	the	fields	and	particles	in	them,	and	see	what	the	theory	 has	 to	 say	 about	 their	 metaphysical	 features	 (of	 course	 in	 tandem	 with	 some	appropriate	metaphysical	theory).		But	if	that	is	the	case,	then	it	seems	that	we	are	back	at	 the	problem	we	started	with	–	namely,	our	 lack	of	 fundamental	 theory.	 	However,	 to	draw	this	conclusion	would	be	overlook	the	fact	that	while	we	may	lack	knowledge	of	the	fundamental	 laws	of	nature,	we	can	hazard	that	they	accord	with	quantum	field	theory.		As	I	will	argue,	this	fact	allows	us	to	identify	generic	features	that	any	fundamental	law	must	 satisfy,	 making	 it	 possible	 to	 make	 substantive	 metaphysical	 claims	 concerning	fundamental	properties,	even	though	we	remain	 in	the	dark	right	now	as	to	what	those	properties	are.34		Let	us	then	turn	to	those	generic	 features.	 	The	simple	but	crucial	 insight	 is	 that,	 in	the	QFT	framework,	to	call	a	law	fundamental	is	to	make	a	quite	specific	predication	of	it:	it	is	to	 affirm,	 at	 the	 very	 least,	 that	 the	 law	 stays	mathematically	 consistent	 in	 the	 limit	 of	
infinite	energy.		We	do	after	all	take	probing	structures	at	higher	and	higher	energies	–	or,	equivalently,	 shorter	and	shorter	distances	–	 to	 correspond	 to	probing	more	and	more	fundamental	regimes,	and	the	continuity	of	space	presupposed	in	Minkowski	spacetime																																																									33	See,	e.g.	Heisenberg	(1975);	Weinberg	(1996).	34	Modulo	the	caveat	regarding	kinematical	properties	made	above.	
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entails	 that	 the	 energy	 range	 that	 is	 available	 to	be	probed	 is	 in	principle	 infinite.	 	We	might	 thus	 follow	 Huggett	 and	 Weingard	 in	 saying	 that	 theories	 valid	 in	 the	 infinite	energy	limit	are	‘continuum	compatible’.35		But	although	this	condition	on	a	fundamental	law	is	easy	to	state,	stating	what	 laws	must	be	 like	to	actually	satisfy	 it	 is	a	much	more	difficult	endeavor,	assuming	that	the	laws	describe	any	interactions.36		What	we	do	know	is	that	continuum	compatibility	is	an	extraordinarily	stringent	requirement	–	so	much	so	that	 there	 is	 a	 general	 feeling	 in	 contemporary	 particle	 physics	 that	 if	 we	 can	 find	 a	theory	of	fundamental	entities	that	satisfies	it,	then	we	have	found	the	theory,	and	so	an	actual	 fundamental	 law	of	 nature.	 	 Part	 of	 the	 reason	 it	 is	 so	hard	 to	write	 down	 laws	satisfying	 continuum	 compatibility	 is	 that	 the	 coupling	 parameters	 that	 appear	 in	QFT	Lagrangians	 –	 to	 repeat,	 those	 associated	 with	 the	 masses	 of	 particles	 and	 the	interactions	 between	 them	 –	 change	 their	 values	 as	 the	 energy	 is	 scaled	 up,	 in	 a	 way	described	by	the	renormalization	group	equation.37		Thus	results	in	the	properties	whose	magnitudes	are	given	by	the	values	of	these	couplings	–	such	as	the	particle’s	mass	and	charge	–	becoming	likewise	scale-dependent.38		Since	generically	we	can	expect	functions	to	diverge	as	their	arguments	do,	we	can	expect	the	mass	or	strength	of	 interactions	of	particles	 in	an	arbitrary	quantum	field	 theory	 to	 likewise	diverge	 in	 the	 limit	–	making	the	theory	that	they	occur	in	mathematically	ill-defined	too.		Thus	a	minimal	consistency	condition	on	any	fundamental	QFT	is	that	all	of	its	coupling	parameters	stay	finite	in	the	infinite-energy	limit.	 	Those	theories	for	which	all	couplings	remain	finite	are	said	to	be	‘asymptotically	safe’.	Theories	for	which	all	of	the	couplings	not	only	stay	finite	but	also	have	 the	 special	 feature	 of	 tending	 to	 zero	 in	 the	 limit	 are	 known	 as	 theories	 that	 are	‘asymptotically	free’.		
																																																								35	Huggett	and	Weingard	(1995).	36	I	will	consider	how	the	existence	of	free	theories	impacts	upon	my	conclusions	below.		37	See	e.g.	Ryder	(1996),	p.	325.	38	Thus,	for	example,	the	charge	on	an	electron	increases	with	energy,	and	the	mass	of	a	quark	decreases.			Thus	what	we	refer	to	as	‘the’	charge	on	an	electron	is	really	just	the	value	of	the	coupling	constant	measured	in	e.g	Thomson	scattering	experiments	at	very	low	energy.		See	e.g.	Maggiore	(2009),	Section	5.9.	
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As	 already	mentioned,	 however,	 the	 only	 theories	 we	 are	 able	 to	 get	 a	 grip	 on	 at	 the	moment	 are	 those	 that	 are	 asymptotically	 free.	 	 While	 the	 lack	 of	 generality	 is	unfortunate,	 there	 is	 nevertheless	 now	 a	 great	 deal	 that	 we	 can	 say	 about	 the	asymptotically	free	case.	 	The	most	important	thing	we	know	is	that	any	asymptotically	free	theory	has	to	be	a	renormalizable	local	gauge	theory:	that	is,	it	must	have	a	form	that	it	 is	 invariant	 under	 the	 transformations	 of	 a	 gauge	 symmetry	 group,	 and	 contains	 no	non-renormalizable	 terms.39		 For	 present	 purposes,	we	 do	 not	 need	 to	 know	 precisely	what	these	terms	mean:	however,	what	we	do	need	to	appreciate	is	that	–	and	somewhat	amazingly	 –	 this	 requirement	 gives	 us	 a	 recipe	 for	 uniquely	 pinning	 down	 the	 laws	 of	nature.		In	a	little	more	detail,	it	gives	us	a	recipe	for	pinning	down	the	laws	of	interaction	pertaining	 to	 fundamental	 constituents	of	matter	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 fundamental	 fermions	–	given	a	specification	of	what	these	fermions	are.		For	example,	suppose	we	are	handed	6	quarks	 –	 that	 is,	 particles	 that	 carry	 colour	 in	 addition	 to	 some	determinate	mass	 and	spin.	 	Then	our	knowledge	that	the	law	appropriate	to	these	particles	must	have	a	local	gauge	 symmetry	 if	 it	 is	 to	 be	 fundamental	 determines	what	 the	 form	 of	 that	 law	 is:	 a	renormalizable	theory	with	gauge	group	SU(3)	is	the	unique	theory	with	this	property.40		Crucially,	 armed	with	 this	 information	one	 can	go	on	and	 show	 that,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	kinematic	 terms	 describing	 the	 quarks’	 free	 motion,	 the	 law	 must	 contain	 a	 term	describing	the	quarks	interacting	with	a	specific	set	of	bosons	through	a	coupling	constant,	
g.		More	generally,	whenever	we	ascribe	fundamental	interaction	properties	to	fermions,	the	 requirement	 of	 local	 gauge	 invariance	 implies	 that	 they	 couple	 through	 those	properties	to	a	set	of	bosons,	with	the	strength	of	the	coupling	measured	by	a	coupling	constant	featuring	in	the	relevant	Lagrangian.	
																																																								39	See	 e.g.	 Wilczek	 op	 cit..	 It	 must	 furthermore	 be	 a	 non-Abelian	 gauge	 theory,	 which	means	that	the	bosons	will	carry	the	same	charges	through	which	the	fermions	interact	with	each	other	and	with	the	bosons.		40	Here	I	assume	that	quark	colour	states	have	the	structure,	in	all	possible	worlds,	of	the	fundamental	 representation	 of	 SU3.	 	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 canonical	 discussions	 of	 the	metaphysics	of	properties	have	 focused	more	or	 less	exclusively	on	classical	properties	means	that	I	cannot	simply	cite	some	authoritative	figure	in	support	of	this	claim.	 	 	For	now,	suffice	to	say	that	I	cannot	imagine	how	someone	could	deny	it;	nor	does	it	beg	the	question	at	hand.	
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This	 requirement	 that	 asymptotically	 free	 theories	 have	 to	 be	 local	 gauge	 theories	 has	profound	implications	for	the	possibility	that	we	may	actually	discover	the	fundamental	laws	 of	 nature,	 given	 empirical	 information	 concerning	what	 fundamental	 kinds	 there	are.		But	it	has	equally	profound	implications	for	the	intrinsicality	of	the	properties	of	the	particles	 that	 feature	 in	 those	 theories.	 	 These	 implications	 may	 be	 divided	 into	 two	classes:	firstly,	those	concerning	the	relationship	of	fermions	to	bosons;	secondly,	those	concerning	 the	 connections	 between	 all	 types	 of	 particles	 with	 (other)	 fermions.	 	 The	first	 class	 of	 implications	 is	 easy	 to	 state:	 it	 is	 that	 any	 interaction	 property	 had	 by	 a	fundamental	fermion	cannot	be	regarded	as	intrinsic,	because	the	possession	of	any	such	
property	 requires	 the	 existence	 of	 bosons.	 	 That	 is,	 since	 fundamental	 particles	 are	particles	 whose	 fields	 appear	 in	 fundamental	 Lagrangians,	 and	 since	 the	 laws	 of	interaction	for	fundamental	fermions	require	the	existence	of	gauge	bosons,	those	bosons	are	 needed	 in	 order	 for	 there	 to	 be	 fermions	 that	we	 can	 designate	 as	 fundamental	 at	all.41	Thus	it	cannot	be	said	that	the	fundamental	interaction	properties	partly	definitive	of	 fundamental	 fermions	are	 intrinsic	 in	character:	on	the	contrary,	 their	very	status	as	fundamental	brings	in	its	train	entities	distinct	from	themselves.	On	account	of	the	relationship	that	fermions	with	these	properties	must	stand	in	to	the	corresponding	gauge	bosons	if	they	are	to	be	fundamental,	then,	we	are	no	longer	able	to	regard	many	of	 the	properties	of	 fundamental	 fermions	as	 intrinsic	 –	 in	particular,	 the	interaction	 properties.	 	 However,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 only	 reason	 why	 considerations	 of	fundamentality	 undermine	 the	 intrinsicality	 of	 the	 features	 defining	 fundamental	particles.		A	further	reason	is	that,	while	local	gauge	invariance	is	a	necessary	feature	of	any	fundamental	law,	it	is	in	itself	insufficient:	for	if	there	are	too	many	types	of	fermions	included	in	the	law	then	the	fundamentality	of	that	law	is	lost.		The	reason	behind	this	is																																																									41	Steven	French	and	I	made	the	argument	that	interaction	properties	cannot	be	intrinsic	because	of	their	relation	to	gauge	bosons	in	French	and	McKenzie	(2012).		That	argument	was	criticized	by	Livanios	however,	on	the	grounds	that	this	relation	could	be	contingent	(see	 Livanios	 2012,	 p.	 32).	 	 This	 argument	 of	 the	 present	 paper	 improves	 on	 that	argument,	 in	 that	 it	exploits	 the	 fact	 that	we	are	not	considering	charge	simpliciter,	but	charge	 qua	 fundamental	 property.	 	 It	 is	 the	 extra	 constraints	 placed	 on	 properties	featuring	in	fundamental	theories	in	particular	that	links	charge	to	gauge	bosons.		
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that	the	behavior	of	the	couplings	in	a	local	gauge	theory	is	sensitive	to	how	many	kinds	(or	 ‘flavours’)	of	 fermions	exist	 in	 the	 theory,	 in	 such	a	way	 that	 (at	 least	 some	of)	 the	couplings	 will	 diverge	 if	 there	 are	 too	 many	 of	 them.42	For	 example,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 a	theory	with	a	local	SU3	gauge	symmetry,	such	as	QCD,	the	number	of	quark	types	in	that	theory	must	be	no	 greater	 than	16	 the	 theory	 is	 to	be	 valid	 to	 arbitrarily	high	 energy;	otherwise	the	coupling	associated	with	colour	will	diverge	in	the	limit,	and	the	law	with	it.43		 And,	 to	 repeat,	 since	 a	 fundamental	 particle	 is	 one	 whose	 field	 appears	 in	 a	fundamental	Lagrangian,	 it	 follows	that	we	cannot	say	that	the	fundamental	 interaction	properties	of	any	given	kind	are	intrinsic,	because	their	very	status	as	fundamental	kind	properties	 depends	 on	 there	 not	 being	 too	many	 other	 kinds	 in	 the	world	 besides	 the	kind	in	question.		Moreover,	while	a	less	obvious	route	to	intrinsicality	than	the	last,	this	approach	is	more	extensive	in	its	reach.	 	This	is	for	at	least	two	reasons.	 	For	one	thing,	the	argument	applies	just	as	much	to	the	properties	of	bosons	as	to	those	of	fermions:	the	colour	charge	on	a	gluon,	say,	will	cease	to	be	capable	of	being	regarded	as	fundamental	if	there	are	17	or	more	fermion	types	inhabiting	the	world	alongside	the	gluon,	just	as	the	colour	charge	on	any	given	type	of	fermion	will	suffer	the	same	fate.		But	furthermore,	the	argument	has	 implications	 for	our	ability	 to	regard	 the	property	of	mass	as	 intrinsic	 in	addition	to	the	interaction	properties.		This	is	because	the	masses	of	particles	in	QFT	are	also	 functions	 of	 the	 energy,	 and	 the	 renormalization	 group	 equation	 describing	 the	coupling	parameter	corresponding	to	mass	is	a	function	of	the	all	couplings	present	in	the	theory.	As	a	result	of	this,	if	the	couplings	diverge	we	can	expect	the	mass	to	diverge	as	well.	So	for	broadly	the	same	reasons	as	before,	it	seems	that	we	cannot	regard	particle	masses	 as	 intrinsic	 in	 any	 straightforward	 sense	 either:	 we	 simply	 cannot	 postulate	fundamental	particles	and	predicate	mass	of	them	without	keeping	an	eye	on	what	other	
																																																								42	Thus,	 as	Wilczek	 puts	 it,	 ‘One	 finds	 that	 only	 nonabelian	 gauge	 theories	with	 simple	matter	content,	and	no	non-renormalizable	couplings,	satisfy	this	criterion	(op	cit.,	p.	3);	similarly	 for	 Ho-Kim	 and	 Yem,	 ‘theories	 of	 non-Abelian	 gauge	 fields	 and	 fermion	multiplets	 are	 asymptotically	 free	only	 if	 the	 theory	does	not	have	 too	many	 fermions’	(1998,	p.	278).	(p.	535).	
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particles	 inhabit	 the	world	alongside	 the	particle.	 	As	 such,	we	 cannot	 say	 that	mass	 is	both	a	fundamental	kind	property	and	intrinsic	at	the	same	time.				We	have	seen,	then,	that	given	how	fundamentality	is	conceived	of	in	physics	we	cannot	consider	either	interaction	properties	or	the	property	of	mass	as	intrinsic	in	anything	like	the	usual	sense.		Without	the	gauge	bosons	to	supplement	the	fundamental	fermions,	the	interaction	properties	of	the	latter	could	not	qualify	as	fundamental;	too	many	fermions	in	the	picture,	on	the	other	hand,	will	rob	all	particles	of	 fundamental	status.	 	What	we	have	 arrived	 at,	 then,	 is	 a	 sort	 of	 ‘Goldilock’s	 principle’	 governing	 the	 fundamental	particle	 kinds:	a	kind	can	only	qualify	as	 fundamental	 if	 there	are	other	kinds	 inhabiting	
the	world	alongside	it,	so	long	as	there	are	not	too	many.44		The	 fundamental	 level	of	 the	world,	then,	seems	not	made	up	of	entities	with	their	own	‘intrinsic	natures’:	each	must	be	sensitive	to	the	totality	of	what	else	exists	in	order	to	be	fundamental	at	all.			It	might	be	objected	at	this	point	that	all	this	has	been	derived	from	the	assumption	that	the	fundamental	kinds	partake	in	laws	of	 interaction.	 	For	it	is	interactions	in	particular	that	make	 it	 difficult	 to	 define	 laws	 that	 stay	well-defined	 in	 the	 limits	 appropriate	 to	
fundamental	laws,	and	which	result	in	the	constraints	on	matter	content	expressed	by	the	Goldilock’s	principle.45		But	one	could	object	that	the	fundamental	kinds	that	we	find	in	this	 world	 can	 all	 feature	 in	 laws	without	 interactions	 –	 specifically,	 the	 laws	 of	 free	motion	to	which	interaction	terms	are	added	when	interaction	laws	are	written	down.		As	such,	one	could	argue	that	although	the	quarks	(for	example)	 that	 feature	 in	our	world	might	 need	 the	 relevant	 gauge	 bosons	 in	 order	 to	 interact,	 they	 could	 quite	well	 exist	without	them	–	namely,	in	worlds	in	which	they	undergo	no	interaction	at	all.		And	since	
																																																																																																																																																																															43	One	 can	 see	 this	 from	 looking	 at	 the	 renormalization	 equation	 governing	 the	 colour	coupling:	see	for	example	Ho-Kim	and	Yem	op	cit.,	equation	15.83	(p.	535).			44	I	owe	this	nice	phrase	to	David	Brink.	45	Note	that	the	supposition	that	the	fields	involved	are	interacting	does	not	in	itself	tell	against	intrinsicality.		For	quantum	field	theory	admits	laws	containing	only	a	single	field	interacting	with	itself	–	although,	by	the	above	arguments,	we	know	that	no	such	law	can	be	regarded	as	fundamental.	
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there	are	worlds	containing	only	lone	quarks,	albeit	of	necessity	free	quarks,	 it	must	be	possible	to	regard	the	properties	of	fundamental	objects	as	intrinsic	after	all.46	However,	 it	 seems	 to	me	 that	 this	 objection	 does	 not	 succeed,	 for	 at	 least	 a	 couple	 of	reasons.		First	of	all,	we	know	that	the	fundamental	objects	in	our	world	are	as	a	matter	
of	 fact	 interacting	 –	 otherwise	we	 could	never	 know	about	 them	 (indeed	we	ourselves	wouldn’t	exist	at	all).	 	And	we	know	from	the	fact	that	they	are	interacting	that	some	of	their	 properties	 are	 scale-dependent.	 	 It	 strikes	me	 that	 an	 object	 in	 a	 world	 without	interactions	–	and	as	such	an	object	whose	properties	are	not	scale-dependent	–	cannot	reasonably	 be	 said	 to	 count	 as	 a	 duplicate	 of	 an	 object	 whose	 properties	 are	 scale-dependent	in	the	way	that	actual-world	objects	are.		For	this	reason	–	and	although	doing	so	 is	 commonplace	 in	 philosophy	 of	 physics	 –	 I	 think	 we	 must	 be	 extremely	 cautious	about	 drawing	 conclusions	 about	 the	 metaphysics	 of	 actual-worldly	 objects	 based	 on	claims	about	worlds	described	by	free	theories.47		But	in	any	case,	the	(putative)	fact	that	an	object	 could	 exist	without	 some	other	object,	 such	as	 a	 gauge	boson,	 existing	 is	not	sufficient	 to	 make	 its	 properties	 intrinsic:	 it	 must	 in	 addition	 be	 the	 case	 that	 its	possessing	those	properties	does	not	preclude	the	existence	of	other	objects	alongside	it.	But	 we	 know	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 fundamental	 objects	 with	 colour	 prohibits	 the	existence	 of	 too	many	 fermions	 in	 any	worlds	 in	which	 those	 objects	 interact.	 	 	 And	 it	seems	to	me	that	the	fact	that	there	are	prohibitions	on	what	can	exist	alongside	coloured	objects	in	even	some	subset	of	the	worlds	in	which	they	exist	–	namely	the	set	of	worlds	
with	interactions	–	is	incompatible	with	the	supposition	of	its	intrinsicality.		In	 sum,	 then,	 we	may	 say	 that	 contra	 Chakravartty,	 Bird,	 and	 seemingly	 almost	 every	other	metaphysician	of	 science	outwith	 structuralism,	 the	 fundamental	 kind	properties	cannot	be	 regarded	as	 intrinsic	after	all.	 	 Insofar	as	OSR	 is	 the	 thesis	 that	 fundamental	objects	lack	intrinsic	properties,	then,	it	is	left	standing	tall.					
8.	Conclusion																																																									46	This	objection	has	likewise	been	raised	by	Livanios	op	cit.,		pp.	33-4.	47	On	this	point,	see	also	Baker	2013,	Section	3.		
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